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BOOK REVIEWS
to be taken to mean that he should be committed to a hospital and
released only when, thanks to shock therapy, other treatment, or sheer
passage of time he is diagnosed as no longer "disturbed." If he is
arrested for some minor sex offense and is called a "psychiatrically
deviate personality" this is likely to be taken to mean something more
than that he has problems and would benefit from psychotherapy.
He may well be committed for an indeterminate period to a custodial
institution whether or not it is in fact in a position to treat him. If
an accused pleads irresponsibility and is called "neurotic" or "psycho-
pathic" this is likely to be taken to mean that he should receive the
maximum retributive sentence.
Dr. MacDonald is certainly aware that it is important for the psy-
chiatrist who participates in the sanctioning process to look at his
own value judgments and his own terminology in the light of their
implications for the broader social scene. I wish he had made it more
explicit in his book. In any event, the expanding knowledge of psy-
chiatry and the increasing participation of psychiatrists in the for-
mation of community policy can only serve to make community deci-
sions more enlightened and more capable of realistic application.
RICHARD C. DONNELLYt
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES. By W. Barton Leach and Owen
Tudor. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1957. Pp. xiii, 265, 1957
Cumulative Supplement. $10.00.
An addict of material on the rule against perpetuities who purchases
any new treatise without looking beyond the cover is doomed to dis-
appointment if he believes he has an entirely new work on the subject
in this particular book. As is clearly stated on the title page this
treatise is: "Reprinted from American Law of Property with Appen-
dices on Perpetuities Reform by Statute Since 1947 and Cumulative
Supplement Prepared by the Authors."
The American Law of Property1 has been comprehensively reviewed
by a large number of legal scholars including a former classmate of
mine, Bertel M. Sparks, Professor of Law at New York University.2
For this reason I would consider it merely "gilding the lily" if I were
to undertake an extensive analysis of the textual portion of the work
under review. However, there are certain parts of the text that should
be called to the attention of those who may not be familiar with the
parent work.
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. 7 vols. Casner ed. (1952).
2. 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1052 (1953).
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The non-expert in the field of perpetuities will undoubtedly appre-
ciate the cross-reference tables keying this book to Gray, Simes and
the Restatement.3 Reference to these tables will save the time of the
researcher who is not content to rely on just one source of infor-
mation.
A greater help to the practicing attorney who has not specialized
in problems involving the rule against perpetuities is the inclusion
of an advocate's check list.4 This section has been divided into two
parts: one division containing hints for those who wish to avoid a
gift under the rule, another containing like help for the lawyer con-
fronted with the task of sustaining such a gift. This material should
be required reading for any draftsman who is faced with the problem
of preparing a will or trust agreement containing an interest subject
to the rule, although the preceding sections is specifically designed to
provide a set of "rules" to be observed in that instance.
Of special interest to the serious student of perpetuities is the in-
clusion of the authors' analysis of the many facets of the rule. It is
impossible to express complete agreement with every position taken,
but it must be admitted that the exploration into the reasons under-
lying the views expressed is more than pure surface testing.
The arrangement of material is also to be commended. There are
ten chapters with each chapter being subdivided into sections. If one
is not thoroughly familiar with the topic, a study of the table of con-
tents will give organization to the information he may possess, and if
he is totally ignorant of the rule, reference to the table from time to
time should clarify the information that is being gained by reading
the text. Caveat: This may not be true of the first chapter which is
intended as an introduction.
The appendices, five in number, deal with statutory reform of the
rule. The first three are reprints from the Harvard Law Review, and
the authors have indicated that a more extensive treatment of the
fifth appendix is being prepared for publication. The other appendix
consists of a copy of a memorandum submitted by Professor Leach
to the Vermont legislature urging adoption of a "statutory reform"
bill pending before that body.
Appendix I is the reprint of Professor Leach's "Perpetuities in
Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror."0 In this article
great ridicule is heaped on the present policy of testing the validity
of an interest subject to the rule by what might have happened rather
than by conditions as they actually exist at the time the controversy
3. § 24.1 A.
4. § 24.8.
5. § 24.7.
6. 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721 (1952).
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reaches the court. Conversely, praise is directed to the Supreme Court
of Florida for testing validity of the interest by what did happen and
to the Pennsylvania legislature for adopting, by statute, the Florida
view.
Adopting the classification and terminology of his earlier article
the author proceeds to demonstrate the absurdity of the "certainty"
aspect of the rule as it applies to the "unborn widow," "administra-
tive contingency" and "fertile octogenarian" cases. The force and
sureness of the argument may lead one to believe that we are dealing
with a one-sided question, but it must be noted that there is opposi-
tion in print.8
Appendix I suggests other deficiencies in the rule, and corrective
legislation is outlined; the bulk of the latter advocating in various
ways the so-called "wait and see" doctrine.
Appendix II is an analysis of perpetuity legislation in Massachu-
setts and Appendix III treats briefly of certain steps taken to reform
the law in England.
If the reader is interested in Professor Leach's idea of exactly what
is wrong with the rule against perpetuities, Appendix IV should sup-
ply the answer. In a memorandum to the Vermont legislature the
two primary Leachian tenets are expressed in simple, but adequate,
style. The first states that an interest should not be voided merely
because it violates the rule; it should be reduced to a point where it
does not violate, but yet closely approximates the intent of the creator
of the interest. Thus, in a devise to X for life, remainder to such of
X's children as reach the age of twenty-five years, the reminder to
the children (where X has children after the death of the testator)
would be reformed to pass the land to such of the children as reached
the age of twenty-one. As X is the measuring life, X's youngest child
would have to reach the age of twenty-one-if he ever did do-within
the period of the rule, and the remainder would be valid. The second
change would require the courts to apply the rule in view of what
actually happens, and not in view of what might have happened.
This is the controversial (at least according to Simes) "wait and see"
doctrine. Applying it to the case above, the court would not reduce
the testator's stated twenty-five year period unless the life tenant, X,
actually had additional children. If X did not have children after the
death of the testator, the children themselves may be taken as the
measuring lives. As they will all reach the age of twenty-five-if they
ever do so-within their own lives there is no violation of the rule.
Appendix V, summarized very briefly, raises the possibility of judi-
7. Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638 (1938).
8. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait and See"
Doctrine, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 179 (1953).
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cial legislation to solve the problem. This may be a harsh condensa-
tion, but the main thought of the material advances the idea that the
courts, in states where there is no legislative reform, may bring about
their own revision of the rule against perpetuities by taking notice
of the great body of legislative reform. Some authority is cited to
show that the courts may and should do this. Will they do so? Even
the authors admit that we will have to "wait and see."
One may have doubts as to the value of a book of this type. This
is not to suggest that the material is inferior. The work is an excel-
lent treatment of one of the more difficult phases of the law. How-
ever, the fact must be faced that it has not added anything new to
the law relating to perpetuities. As the title page informs you: This
is a reprint.
JOHN E. HowEt
CREATED EQUAL?: THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF
1858. Edited by Paul M. Angle. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958. Pp. 422. $7.50.
During the Faubus affair last autumn, editor-columnist David
Lawrence came to the defence of "white supremacy" by quoting Abra-
ham Lincoln. Well, that may not be quite fair: technically, Mr.
Lawrence was using Lincoln as authority for the proposition that the
Supreme Court is not the final interpreter of the Constitution. After
all, had not the Court, in 1857, declared that slavery could not be pro-
hibited in any territory of the United States," and had not Lincoln
four years later ignored this decision by asking: "Can Congress pro-
hibit slavery in the territories?" and treating that question as un-
settled?2
If Mr. Lawrence had perused the Lincoln-Douglas joint debates
and individual campaign speeches of 1858, now put together in a
handsome centennial edition edited by Paul Angle, he could have
found more Lincolnian ammunition for his attack on judicial su-
premacy. Also, surprisingly, he could have discovered some language
seeming to support "white supremacy." What about this, for in-
stance: "I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been in favor of
bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the
white and black races, that I am not nor ever have been in favor of
making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold
office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say in addition
to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black
t Assistant Dean and Professor of Law, St. Louis University.
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Howard) 393 (1857).
2. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.
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